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The Nigerian banking system was in crisis for much of the 1990's and early 2000's.  The reforms of
2005 were ambitious in simultaneously attempting to address safety, soundness, and accessibility.
This paper uses published and new survey data through 2008 to investigate whether bank consolidation
and other measures achieved their stated goals and whether they also enhanced development, efficiency,
and profitability.  Following the reforms, banks are better capitalized, more efficient, and less involved
in the public sector but not more profitable and accessible to the poor.   While there is greater supervision
and less fragility, recorded distress was artificially low.  The improved macroeconomic environment





East Lansing, MI 48824
lisacook@msu.edu3 
 
The recent global financial crisis provides the latest evidence that resolving banking crises can be 
costly in any country.  Losses typically represent a larger share of income in developing countries 
than in industrialized countries.  For example, between 1987 and 1993, Norway, Sweden, and 
Finland had bank insolvency crises whose resolution cost 4.0, 6.4, and 8.0 percent of GDP.  At 
approximately the same time similar crises in Mauritania, Senegal, and Cote d’Ivoire cost 15.0, 17.0, 
and 25.0 percent of GDP.
1    Such potential losses provide a compelling reason for economists to 
identify and for policymakers to develop and adopt policies to prevent such episodes in the poorest 
countries.   A recent literature has focused on analyzing which policies promote the development, 
efficiency, corporate governance, and accessibility of banks, e.g., Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001, 
2008), Abiad and Mody (2005), and Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009).  Another literature makes the 
further link between finance and growth, e.g., King and Levine (1993a, 1993b), Levine and Zevros 
(1998), and Rajan and Gonzales (1998).  Given that African countries have lagged other countries in 
adopting bank reforms, knowing whether the findings from cross-country evidence are relevant is 
difficult.  Nigeria’s banking reform of 2005 provides a natural experiment in which to test the 
efficacy of best practices in Africa.  Did the banking regulation and supervision reforms of 2005 
make the financial system more sound?  Did they contribute to development, efficiency, and 
accessibility of the banking system?  If so, which mechanisms were most important?  Data from 
Nigeria’s experiment are combined with new survey data to address these questions.  I find that in 
the immediate aftermath of the policy changes, the financial system was more stable than it was 
previously.  While it is found that development and efficiency have increased, the successes in 
introducing more small savers and borrowers to the formal banking sector have been more limited.  
Seventy-four percent of Nigerian residents remain unbanked, including 70 percent or more of 
                                                            
1 Caprio and Klingbiel (1996), pp. 13-19. 4 
 
business owners and traders.  This has large implications with respect to changing the incentives and 




I.  The Nigerian Bank Reform of 2005 
 
The 2005 Nigerian banking reform was a watershed event.   To put its significant changes in 
historical perspective, I will review the principal institutional features of Nigerian banking preceding 
reform. 
 
A.  Recent Reform Efforts 
 
A nationalization effort in the 1970’s and 1980’s left Nigeria’s banks subject to extensive state 
intervention and control.  Before Nigeria initiated its Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1986, 
the banking sector was plagued by problems characteristic of many African and poor countries at 
the time.  Direct intervention by the state was accomplished using a number of instruments, 
including credit and interest-rate controls and restrictions on entry.   There were few banks – 29 
commercial banks and 12 merchant banks for a population of 84 million.  There was little activity 
outside the government sector, as it accounted for 80 percent of commercial banks’ and 45 percent 
of merchant banks’ assets.  There was little competition, entry, and exit.  The financial liberalization 
program accompanying SAP was designed to address these issues and to extend lending and other 
banking services.  Specifically, its measures included reducing barriers to entry, liberalization of 
lending and savings rates, introducing an interbank foreign exchange market, deregulating interbank 5 
 
lending, and privatizing a number of banks and financial institutions. The success of this reform was 
mixed.  The number of market participants increased.  Eight times the number of banks entered 
annually from 1987 to 1990 than had in the previous decade.  Figure 1 displays this exponential 
growth in each sector of the banking industry.  Yet, much of the resulting banking activity was not 
concentrated on lending to the private sector and households but on exploiting new arbitrage 
opportunities in foreign-exchange operations and money-market interest-rate spreads.
2  If consistent 




The number of banks peaked at 120 in 1991.  Simultaneously, banks began accumulating non-
performing loans at an increasing rate, and the share of distressed banks doubled from 26 percent in 
1991 to 52 percent in 1995.  There was a bank run in 1993, and the banking sector entered a period 
of sustained crisis.
4   To address bank insolvency, minimum capital requirements were increased in 
1988 and 1989.  They were increased again in 1991, and other measures were implemented to 
enhance the regulatory and supervisory powers of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in the Banks 
and Other Financial Institutions Law of 1991.  The licenses of 26 banks were revoked in 1998, and, 
by 2002, only 16 percent of banks were insolvent.  Nonetheless, this was still high by international 
standards, as was the ratio of non-performing loans to the total, 25 percent in 2002.   New policies 
and institutional changes in 2001 were aimed at increasing the stability of the banking system.  In 
addition, to increase the flow of credit to and speed up the development of the private sector, 
                                                            
2 See Lewis and Stein (1997) for a detailed account of this reform episode. 
3 See, for example, Beck and Fuchs (2004). 
4 While most researchers agree that expansionary fiscal and monetary policy contributed to financial collapse in the 
1990’s, alternative views of the principal causes of the banking crisis have emerged in the literature.  Beck, et al.  (2005) 
attribute the crisis to flaws in the liberalization agenda that resulted in rent-seeking behavior by banks and a concomitant 
shift in resources from the real economy to banks.   Lewis and Stein (2004) emphasize the bad political and institutional 
setting in which reforms were undertaken in explaining the crisis. 6 
 




B.  The Need for Reform 
 
While relatively more credit flowed to the private sector, the fundamental issue of insolvency had 
not been addressed by the 2001 law nor by incremental increases in capital requirements and still 
threatened the system.  By 2004, many banks were undercapitalized, despite having met minimum 
capital requirements of roughly $7.5 million for existing banks and $15 million for new banks.  
Shareholders’ funds had been reduced by operating losses, further contributing to insolvency.  More 
than one third of all banks were “marginal” or “unsound” according to CBN criteria.
5   Twenty-
eight percent of bank loans were non-performing.
6  While bank concentration was falling, it was still 
high with 10 banks accounting for half the deposits and assets of the banking system (see Figure 2).   
Other conditions prevailing in 2004 that threatened bank development, bank efficiency, corporate 
governance, and accessibility were overreliance on public-sector deposits, weak corporate 
governance and substantial insider lending that resulted in large portfolios of non-performing loans, 
and neglect of small and medium-sized savers.
7  Many of the problems in the larger banking sector 
were reflected in the microfinance sector among community banks, the latest institution designed to 
address the lack of access to finance among firms, households, and the rural poor.
8  An additional 
threat to the market for microfinance was regulatory arbitrage, because operators could select to 
                                                            
5 CBN (2006). 
6 Ibid.  These data for the year ending on September 30, 2005.   
7 See Soludo (2004) for a complete description of prevailing conditions. 
8 A number of experiments had been implemented in the past three decades to address rural and poor savers and 
borrowers, including the People’s Bank of Nigeria, which offered soft loans, and mandated rural bank branching for 
commercial banks.  Cook (2004) reviews a number of these schemes.  See FAO (2004) and Isern, et al (2009) for 
additional assessments of the performance of community banks and other microfinance institutions. 7 
 
which body they would report and, by extension, by whom they would be regulated – the central 
bank or the National Board of Community Banks, which was appointed by the Ministry of Finance.
9 
 
In July of 2004, the Governor of CBN, Charles Soludo, announced an ambitious, 13-point reform 
agenda to comprehensively reform the banking system.  The centerpiece of the proposed changes 
was a more than 10-fold increase in the minimum capital requirement for banks from NN 2 billion 
to NN 25 billion (roughly $190 million).  Meeting the new capital standard could only be 
accomplished by mergers, acquisitions, or injections of new capital. This type of bank consolidation 
was a novel feature of reform, because there were no such restrictions in earlier rounds of raising 
capital requirements and because there was little history of mergers and acquisitions in the Nigerian 
banking sector.
10  Other major elements of the reform program were a phased withdrawal of public-
sector funds from Nigerian banks, adoption of a rule-based regulatory framework that was more 
risk-focused, and restructuring of the information-gathering and reporting mechanism to ensure 
greater compliance and transparency.   Importantly, while insider lending had been identified as a 
major problem, corporate governance was on the list of reforms, and a Code of Corporate 
Governance was enacted by the CBN for banks in March 2006, corporate governance was given less 
attention relative to bank consolidation and higher capital requirements.
11  The central bank also 
anticipated higher capital requirements, NN 20 million, and greater supervision and separation of 
the microfinance sector, since community banks were found to have inadequate capital relative to 
lending risk and weak institutional capacity.  In the remainder of the paper, I will assess the effects 
of these regulatory changes in the banking sector. 
                                                            
9 Cook (2004) cites regulatory arbitrage as a major threat to the community banking sector.   The problem of uneven 
reporting, late reporting, and non-reporting and the resulting lack of transparency were common to the entire financial 
system. 
10 Failed banks during the 1998 reform were liquidated by the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation, much in the way 
the S&L crisis was resolved in the U.S. in the late 1980’s and 1990’s.  See Ezeoha (2007) for an historical account. 
11 See Ogunleye (2003) for an analysis of the relation between bank failures and corporate governance in the 1990’s. 8 
 
C.  Outcomes 
 
The bank-consolidation process was largely complete as mandated by the end of 2005.  All but four 
banks participated in mergers and acquisitions.  Fourteen banks which failed to sufficiently increase 
their capital base lost their licenses, and 25 banks remained, as is reported in Figure 1.  Community 
banks were also asked to increase their capital base and convert to microfinance banks (MFBs) 
starting in 2006.  By the end of 2008, 603 of the 757 community banks had converted, applications 
for new banks were received, and the number of MFBs totaled 840.
12  Some larger banks also 
acquired community banks.   A number of auxiliary institutions were created or invited to participate 
in the microfinance support network, including the MFB Development Fund, the National 
Microfinance Consultative Committee, the Association for Microfinance Institutions, a credit 
reference bureau, credit rating agencies, and programs for deposit insurance.  Before embarking on 
graphical and empirical analysis, I describe the data collected and their sources. 
 
 
II.  Data 
 
 
Bank- and system-level data sets are constructed for analysis.  Bank-level data are collected from the 
financial statements of individual banks and from Statistical Bulletins,  Banking Supervision Annual 
Reports, and Annual Reports of CBN for various years.  Banks are required to report balance-sheet and 
profit data to CBN, and a subset of these data are reported in these publications.  Given the small 
number of banks, each can be tracked over time, and a panel data set is constructed for the years 
                                                            
12 CBN (2008).  Not all community banks converted to MFBs due to insolvency and subsequent license revocation.   9 
 
2001 to 2008.  System-wide data are gleaned from several sources for the years 1990 to 2008.  In 
addition to the aforementioned CBN sources, aggregate data have been collected from Beck and 
Demirgüç-Kunt (2009), Beck, et al. (2009), International Financial Statistics 2010 (IMF), and the 
Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU).  Data on consumer finance are taken from the 2008 national 
survey of 25,000 households conducted by EFinA.  Data on the Nigerian banking system are also 
extracted from three rounds of surveys of bank regulatory and supervisory authorities to identify 
features of bank regulation, supervision, and structure found in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 
(2000, 2004, 2007).  
 
III. Graphical Evidence 
 
Before moving on to the formal empirical tests, in some cases mere inspection of the data will be 
sufficient to convey general patterns in the data.  Graphical evidence is presented below and is 
followed by regression analysis. 
 
 
A.  Major Stated Objectives 
 
Figure 2 shows that the ratio of distressed banks to total dropped from 14 percent in 2005 to four 
percent in 2006 to zero percent in 2007 and that the share of non-performing loans relative to total 
loans and advances fell from 28 percent in 2004 to eight percent in 2008.  As anticipated, there is 
less government intervention in the banking sector, whether measured by deposits or ownership of 
government securities (Figure 3), and the level of bank concentration, typically a measure of 
competitiveness in a banking system, had fallen by the end of 2008 (Figure 4).  Credit to the public 10 
 
sector fell as credit to the private sector rose (Figure 5).  However, Figure 6 shows that the ratio of 
bank credit to deposits has increased markedly since 2004, which means that banks must rely on 
other sources of funding, e.g., capital markets, to support significantly higher lending activity.  I 
return to this point below. 
 
Bank supervisors and banks were charged with taking greater account of risk.  Data on capital 
adequacy, liquidity, and asset quality in Table 1 demonstrate the extent to which this happened.  
Although the minimum capital adequacy ratio is 10 percent, most banks have significantly exceeded 
the prescribed ratio since 2005.  The liquidity ratio increased by more than 50 percent before settling 
slightly above the 2005 ratio.  In tandem with the decline in the share of non-performing loans was a 
reduction in bad-debt provisioning from 27 percent of total loans and advances to six percent, 
which freed up resources for other uses.  From the EIU index of banking risk, which reflects an 
evaluation of risk management and potential for crisis, has fallen sharply since the 2005 reforms, as 
can be seen in Figure 4.  Banks’ reporting has increased, and relatively more data are available.  
Among MFBs, the share of non-reporting banks has declined from 82 percent in 2001 to zero 
percent in 2008.
13  Using data from the Levine, et al. survey capital regulatory and official 
supervisory power indices were constructed as in Barth, et al. (2001).  Higher levels of the index 
imply better positioning of the financial system with respect to initial and overall capital stringency 
and official supervisory power.  While the capital regulatory index was unchanged between 2000 and 
2007, the index of supervisory power improved more than 10 percent between 2000 and 2007.  This 
would be consistent with increases in the scope and depth of CBN’s supervisory role stemming 
from the 2005 reforms. 
 
                                                            




B.  Other Financial Indicators 
 
With respect to bank development, financial deepening increased between 2004 and 2008, using a 
variety of measures.   As in King and Levine (1993), a broad measure of financial depth is the ratio 
of liquid liabilities (currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and other financial 
intermediaries) to GDP.  This ratio fell initially and then rose from 2006.  M2/GDP nearly doubled 
from 19.8 percent to 38 percent, and credit to the private sector more than doubled from 13.2 
percent to 33.5 percent.
14  Financial development may also be measured by the relative importance 
of deposit money banks’ assets to central bank assets.  The ratio of deposit money bank assets to 
deposit money bank assets and central bank assets has increased from 0.83 in 2004 to 1.15 in 2008.
15  
 
How much better were Nigerian banks at intermediating society’s savings into private sector credits 
than before?  Cross-country evidence, e.g., Beck and Fuchs (2004), shows that higher interest 
spreads are inversely related to credit to the private sector as a fraction of GDP.  Figure 6 
demonstrates that Nigerian banks are more efficient at intermediation than prior to 2005, as 
measured by bank credit to bank deposits.  Figure 7 shows that they are more efficient by other 
measures, i.e., by declining overhead costs as a fraction of total assets.  There is mixed evidence on 
                                                            
14 CBN Annual Reports. 
15 While the explicit relation between financial development and growth is beyond the scope of this paper, King and 
Levine (1993a,b) and Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) show that financial development and growth are positively 
related. 12 
 
efficiency using data on net interest margin from the Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2004) series, which 
suggests that it has fallen, and the EIU series, which suggests that it is unchanged in Figure 8.
16   
 
Are banks more profitable in the post-reform years?  Figure 7 indicates they were slightly more 
profitable in terms of return on assets and return on equity.  More generally, these findings conform 
to cross-country evidence, as well, e.g., Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009).  Returns on assets have 
decreased and then increased across countries.  While returns on equity have converged to 15 
percent in high- and middle-income countries, as in Nigeria, their variance is significantly higher in 
lower income countries, also as in Nigeria.   
 
C.  Microfinance Institutions 
In tandem with activity in the larger banking sector, the MFBs’ capital-to-asset ratio increased from 
24 percent in 2003 to 30 percent in 2008 (see Table 8).  With respect to accessibility, MFBs have 
increased their lending relative to deposits from 59 percent in 1998 to 69 percent in 2008.  However, 
according to a large national household survey conducted in 2008, large swathes of the population, 
including farmers, traders, owners of firms, and the poorest, remain without access to banking 
services.  Results from analysis of these data appear in Tables 2 to 7.  More than three quarters of 
respondents have had neither a savings nor a checking account.  Two percent of respondents have 
ever had a loan from a community bank.   In terms of loans to the rural population, 1.1 percent of 
the adult population has or once had a loan from MFBs compared to 0.7 percent from commercial 
banks.
17  Ninety-three percent of those in the sample prefer to receive cash as payment, and the 
share is 0.99 for business owners.  Since these are cross-section data, it is unclear whether over time 
                                                            
16 Although not pictured here, data were collected on the bank cost-income ratio, overhead costs relative to gross 
revenues, between 1992 and 2008.  These data also indicate that banks are more efficient, as the lowest levels in this 
range are 0.547 and 0.510 in 2007 and 2008, which reflected a downward trend starting most recently in 2003. 
17 Author’s calculation from EFinA(2008). 13 
 
small savers and earners have benefited from the recent reforms, but it is clear that most in Nigeria 
remain unconnected to formal means of saving and borrowing.   
 
Some time-series data exist from other sources.  The CBN reports that lending by MFBs to 
manufacturing, transportation, and communications has fallen dramatically as a share of the total, 
while the share of lending for trading activities has increased from 36 percent to 44 percent between 
2001 and 2008.  There are no data on lending to households, and it is unclear among sectors of 
economic activity which may be better for microenterprises and, by extension, poverty alleviation.
18  
Nonetheless, given innovation and excess demand in transportation, e.g., “okada” motorbikes as a 
form of transportation, and communications, e.g., rapid increases in penetration of mobile phones, 
there may exist some missed opportunities among microenterprises. 
 
Another indicator of access is the number of banks reporting significant investment in microfinance 
activities.  In 2008, six large banks report having MFBs as subsidiaries or microfinance units in their 
banks, and four report investing in two MFBs, including Accion MFB Ltd.
19  In this instance, too, it 
is difficult to evaluate changes that may benefit the poor. 
 
More formal assessments of the reforms have been mixed.  Ezeoha (2007) finds evidence of a 
fundamental change in the financial structure but suggests that the sustainability of reforms will 
depend on continuously improving macroeconomic conditions and on public confidence in the 
government’s commitment to reform.  Hesse (2007) analyzes pre-reform interest-rate spreads and 
                                                            
18 While manufacturing may be an obvious mechanism for raising employment, it is not obvious that microenterprises 
are the best candidates among other potential borrowers for credit extension, since many manufacturing activities 
depend on exploiting economies of scale. 
19 Another MFB, AB MFB (Nig.) Ltd. is wholly owned by foreign interests, including two German NGOs, the African 
Development Bank, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).   14 
 
finds that they warranted intervention.  However, there is no test of the effect of intervention on 
post-reform spreads.  World Bank (2006) uses bank-level data from 2000 to 2005 to test the effect 
of overhead costs and other covariates on two different measures of interest spreads and finds 
support for increased efficiency of intermediation among Nigerian banks.  Somoye (2008) examines 
key financial variables and simultaneously rejects the null of no change, e.g., in total assets and bank 
capitalization, and fails to reject the null of no change, e.g., in efficiency and bank lending to the 
private and non-banking sectors.  Onaolapo (2008) evaluates the relation between bank 
capitalization and financial soundness using data on the Nigerian banking sector from 1990 to 2006.  
He finds evidence of a positive relation between bank capitalization, distress management, and asset 
quality.   
 
These analyses were able to exploit at most one year of post-reform data.  The passage of time 
allows a more comprehensive analysis to be undertaken, which is the contribution of this paper. 
 
 
IV.  Reform and Changes in Financial Indicators 
 
The empirical strategy in the paper rests on using different measures of bank efficiency and risk 
management to test the null hypothesis of no effect on banks and the banking system.  It is 
anticipated that the set of reforms will allow banks to become more efficient at intermediation.   
 
 
A.  Efficiency 
 15 
 
A time-series data set is constructed from all banks and financial intermediaries operating in the 
period 1992 to 2008.  Two measures of bank efficiency are used in the empirical analysis.  Following 
Stulz (1999), Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999), and Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2009), I 
conjecture that financial development and structure affect firm performance and, more particularly, 
bank performance.  Bank efficiency also depends on overhead cost.  One model uses bank efficiency 
measured by the ex ante interest margin, i.e., interest-rate spreads, or the difference in saving and 
lending rates.   Another model uses bank efficiency measured by the ex post interest margin, i.e., net 
interest margins, or the ratio of net interest income to total assets, which accounts for the possibility 
that banks that charge high interest rates may experience high default rates.  To distinguish the effect 
of cost, development, structure, and bank reform from general economic conditions, 
macroeconomic variables are included in estimation.  Specifically, I estimate the basic regression 
 
 
EFt  =      α  +  βOV/tat  + γBDSt  +    δXt   + ζ2005t  +  η2005* OV/tat  +  εt  ,      (1) 
 
     
where EFt is the interest spread or net interest margin at time t; OV/tat is overhead cost scaled by 
total assets at t; BDSt are financial-development and -structure variables – bank assets/GDP, bank 
concentration as measured by the ratio of the three largest banks’ assets to total assets, and 
loans/liabilities (measures extent of intermediation by the banking system); Xt contains measures of 
opportunity costs and macroeconomic variables – liquid assets/deposits, equity, the real treasury bill 
rate, inflation rate, and log of industrial production at t; and εt is a random error term.
20  It would be 
important to control for opportunities and opportunity costs associated with liquidity and capital, as 
Nigerian banks had high levels of both following bank consolidation.  There is reason to believe that 
a mechanism most affected by reforms was cost, since the cost of allocating resources should fall 
                                                            
20 The inclusion of a measure of liquidity and of equity follow Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) in their analysis of Latin 
America.  They reflect the fact that high levels of liquidity will increase costs that are passed on to borrowers and 
increase spreads, while high levels of capital will impose opportunity costs with respect to equity. 16 
 
with falling costs associated with economies of scales achieved following mergers and higher levels 
of capitalization, hence the interaction term.
21  OLS models are executed in the aggregate sample.  
Due to persistence in the series, models are estimated in first differences with trend.   Tests for 
structural breaks identify 2005 as the break year in the series, and this dummy is included.  Standard 
errors robust to autocorrelation are calculated and reported.  Table 5 contains mean values of 
industry- and bank-level variables used in estimation. 
 
Table 9 reports the results of regressing interest-rate spreads on bank costs, development, and 
structure.  The estimated coefficient on the 2005 year dummy is negative and significant, as 
anticipated.  However, it also negative and significant for overhead cost/total assets.  This result 
likely reflects temporarily elevated costs associated with restructuring, e.g., adoption of the e-FASS 
system, that nonetheless increased efficiency.   This finding is consistent with systematic evidence 
from an industry study by PwC (2009), which shows that the cost-income ratio fell from 0.65 on 
average to 0.56 among the largest banks.  There is also evidence that banks invested in R&D to 
make them internationally with respect to customer access, e.g., ATMs and Internet banking.
22  
While the sign on the interaction term is negative, it is not significant.   
 
Table 10 reports the results of regressing interest-rate spreads on an alternative measure of bank 
development, controls for opportunity costs related to excess liquidity and capital, and 
macroeconomic variables.   The estimated coefficients from this specification are similar to those 
reported in Table 9.  The macroeconomic variables have the anticipated effect on interest spreads, 
although the estimated coefficient on the inflation rate is significant.  
                                                            
21 Among the reforms implemented was the introduction of an electronic financial analysis and surveillance system (e-
FASS), which permitted automated submission of returns by financial institutions.  Adoption of such technology and 
related technological innovations should aid in mitigating operating costs in information-poor environments. 
22 See Kasekende, et al. (2009) for a review of banking competitiveness in Africa’s four largest economies. 17 
 
 
Table 11 reports the results of regressing net interest margin on bank costs, development, and 
structure.  Again, the estimated coefficient on overhead cost/total assets is positive and significant.  
However, from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009) this finding is consistent with those from low 
income countries where bank overhead costs/total assets and net interest margin are correlated and 
both high relative to middle- and high-income countries.  The results on overhead cost are also very 
close in size, direction, and significance to those of World Bank (2006), which uses Nigerian bank 
data for 2001 to 2005 and includes additional controls for excess liquidity and capital (see above) and 
macroeconomic indicators.  Dermirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) find a positive relation between 
cost and net interest margin using data from 80 countries.  From the positive and significant 
coefficient on the interaction term, this relation was stronger after 2004.   
 
 
B.  Risk Management and Bank Performance 
 
If there is less distress in the system, e.g., a lower share of nonperforming loans to the total, it is 
anticipated that banks would require fewer resources for loan loss provisioning.  Alternatively, the 
ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans may indicate portfolio quality.  The bank-level sample is 
constructed from banks existing in 2006.
23  The sample period is 2001 to 2008.  In these regressions 
the dependent variable is the provision of bad debt to total loans and advances.    Specifically, the 
model estimated is 
 
PBDit  =  α  +  βBANKit  + γBDSt  +  ζ2005t  +  ηMACROt  +  εit  ,        (2)   
 
                                                            
23 A sample is constructed from variables available from uniform reports on individual large banks available from 2001.   18 
 
where  PBDit is provision for bad debt/total loans and advances, and the indicators of bank 
development and bank structure are bank assets to GDP and bank concentration.  BANKit 
comprises controls for bank-specific characteristics:  the ratio of equity to lagged total assets, 
dummies for new (or merged) bank and foreign ownership, and bank and year dummies.    The 
macroeconomic indicators included in MACROt  are GDP growth rate and inflation rate.  To 
account for a structural break in the dependent variable, Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are 
calculated and reported with estimated coefficients in Table 12.  I find that the estimated coefficient 
on the year 2005 is not significant when accounting for bank and macroeconomic characteristics.   
Consistent with the findings of Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) and Bikker and Hu (2002), this 
evidence is suggestive that asset quality will be positively affected by higher growth and lower 
inflation.   Further, it is consistent with Beny and Cook (2009) that shows that better economic 
management was correlated with Africa’s growth spurt in the early 2000’s.  The evidence suggests 
that a larger capital base is correlated with the ability to manage expected bankruptcy costs.   
 
The findings from this study are largely in line with previous studies.  Only one major result is 
challenged by the analysis in this paper – Somoye’s (2008) failure to reject the null hypothesis of 
significant change in bank efficiency and lending to the private sector.  Tests of structural breaks 
require testing the relative significance of several adjacent years to the candidate year, and earlier 
tests would not have had post-2005 data available for checking maximum significance.   
 
One limitation of this analysis and that of others is that recorded distress may have been artificially 
low.  Recall that CBN reported no banks in distress between 2006 and 2008, despite such signals as 
a decline of 46 percent in the Nigerian All-Share Index in 2008, which is shown in Figure 8.   
Nigerian banks were overextended in 2008 when the loans-to-deposits ratio exceeded 1.5 (see Figure 19 
 
6), which was similar to that of Western banks prior to and during the financial crisis of 2008.  This 
should have alarmed bank regulators earlier than it did.  In late 2009, two stress tests were executed 
on the 24 banks, and significant distress and poor corporate governance were identified in the 
banking system.  Ten banks failed the tests, and the CBN determined that the system required a 
capital and liquidity injection of $4.12 billion.  It is estimated that rescued banks held N2 trillion 
($13.3 billion) in “toxic” loans.  Executives at one third of all banks were forcibly removed and 
arrested.  As aforementioned, while corporate governance was among the reform items, it did not 
feature prominently in the reform program prior to 2009.  These events suggest that the reforms of 
2005 may have protected the banking system from a worse crisis than may have evolved but that 
additional reform on the part of the banks and the central bank is required.  In particular, it seems 
that better internal controls and bank monitoring are warranted, along with timely and relevant 




V.  Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the consequences of major reforms undertaken in the Nigerian banking sector 
in 2005.  Firm-level and time-series data allow the extension of analysis conducted shortly after the 
reforms.   A statistically significant break is identified in most financial series at the year 2005.  There 
is increased banking-sector development and greater competition and less government intervention 
in bank activity.  Further, I find that banks are more efficient than prior to the reforms and that this 
change is correlated with overhead costs generally and from 2005.  Asset quality increased between 
2005 and 2008, which is correlated with a higher capital base.  Favorable macroeconomic conditions 20 
 
likely enhanced the impact of the reforms.  Nonetheless, it is ambiguous whether changes in the 
microfinance sector aided the poor. 
 
While the reforms of 2005 increased safety and soundness by several measures, the analysis suggests 
that bank distress was un- or under-reported after 2005.  Along with non-performing loans, 
corporate governance, which received less attention than other reforms, may require more 
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Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin 2007. 
Notes: After 2000, universal banking was introduced in Nigeria, which eliminated the classification into merchant 
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Source: [Distressed banks] Author's calculation, CBN Statistical Bulletin 2007,  Onaolapo (2008); 
[Non-performing loans, 2001-2008] Author's calculation, CBN Banking Supervision Annual 
 Reports 2007, 2005 & 2008; [Non-performing loans, 1990-2000] Alashi S. O. (2002) cited in  
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Figure 4.  Bank Concentration and Banking Sector Risk, 1992-2008 
 
Source: [Bank concentration]  Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009); 
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Figure 5.  Lending to Public Sector/Total, Lending to Private Sector/Total, Lending per Income 
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Table 1. Financial Soundness Indicators, Nigerian Banking System, 2004-2008 
 
  
Indicator 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Average S.D.
Capital Adequacy
Capital adequacy ratio 14.2 17.8 22.6 20.9 21.9 19.5 3.5
Liquidity
Liquidity ratio 52.0 41.3 65.1 60.9 46.5 53.1 9.9
Aggregate credit to deposit ratio 74.0 66.6 65.1 70.9 70.9 69.5 3.6
Asset Quality
Non-performing credits to total loans and advances 27.9 24.2 10.7 10.2 7.5 16.1 9.2
Bad debt provision to total loans and advances  22.6 19.1 6.3 8.1 6.1 12.5 7.8
Source:  CBN Annual Reports 2004 - 2008
Note: Capital adequacy ratio = (qualifying capital / risk-weighted assets) x 100.  At least 50 percent of qualifying capital shall comprise 
paid-up capital and reserves.    From January 2004, minimum capital adequacy ratio is statutorily set at 10 percent. 
Liquidity ratio = (Total specified liquid assets / total current liabilities) x 100.
Statutory minimum liquidity ratio was changed from 40 percent to 30 percent in 2008.




Table 2.  Characteristics of the Banked and Unbanked in Nigeria, 2008 
 
  
Never banked Previously banked Currently banked
Gender
Male 67 7 27
Female 82 3 15
Area
Urban 54 7 39
Rural 82 4 14
Socio-economic status
AB 23 0 77
C1 7 3 91
C2 25 4 70
DE 81 5 13
Regular sources of income
Salaries 23 5 71
Subsistence farming 88 4 8
Commercial farming 85 6 9
Trading of goods and services (non farming) 69 5 25
Money from family/friends 74 3 23
Own business (non farming) 71 6 23
Do not receive income 91 4 5
Source: FinScope/EFInA (2008)
Note: Calculation of socioeconomic status includes education, type of house, occupation, and ownership of
household durables.  Categories are roughly equivalent as follows: AB high income (0.4% of adult population); C1 
upper middle income (1.2% of adult population); C2  lower middle income (11.2% of adult population); and DE 
low income (87.3% of adult population).34 
 
Table 3: Means of Receiving Income 
 
 









All  DE Status DE+C2 Status Own Business
Own Business 
& DE Status
Own Business & 
DE+C2 Status
Cash 92.7 96.1 93.3 98.6 99.2 98.6
Cheque 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.7
Into bank account 6.3 3.2 5.7 0.6 0.3 0.6
Other 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
Source: Author's calculation from FinScope/EFinA (2008)
Note: Calculation of socioeconomic status includes education, type of house, occupation, and ownership of
household durables.  Categories are roughly equivalent as follows: C2  lower middle income (11.2% of adult population) 
and DE  low income (87.3% of adult population).  Columns (2) to (4) are calculated from all sources of income.
Columns (5) to (7) are calculated for people whose regular source of income is own business.






Never had savings account 76.1 83.3 77.1 73.5 80.5 74.3
Never had current account 89.3 93.6 90.2 89.4 93.6 90.3
Never had credit card 96.6 98 96.9 96.1 97.4 96.4
Never had loan from microfinance/community bank 98.1 98.4 98.1 97.8 98.1 97.9
Currently have loan 6.8 6.5 6.6 9.3 9.2 9.2
Loan to start business (of those with loans currently) 22.7 23.6 23.2 29.4 30.7 29.7
  Source of loan from commercial bank 10.0 5.8 9.9 3.9 0.6 3.5
  Source of loan from microfinance/community bank 4.3 3.9 4.4 1.4 0.5 1.4
Loan to expand business (of those with loans currently) 30.2 31.2 30.5 49.2 50.6 48.76
  Source of loan from commercial bank 7.7 3.6 6.0 7.5 3.7 5.5
  Source of loan from microfinance/community bank 6.0 4.2 5.48 2.3 1.9 1.8
Source: Author's calculation from FinScope/EFinA (2008)
Note: Calculation of socioeconomic status includes education, type of house, occupation, and ownership of
household durables.  Categories are roughly equivalent as follows: C2  lower middle income (11.2% of adult population) 
and DE  low income (87.3% of adult population). 35 
 
Table 5.  Summary Statistics 
 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Time series (1992-2008)
Private credit/GDP 17 0.13 0.04 0.08 0.25
Output gap 17 -0.90 5.13 -11.13 4.81
Real GDP per capita (N, 2000 prices) 17 47,306        9,747        38,691        64,773       
Non-performing loans/total assets 17 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.19
Real interest rate (%) 17 -2.76 19.53 -52.60 14.34
Overhead cost/total assets 17 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.10
ROE 17 0.25 0.08 0.09 0.44
ROA 17 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05
Interest spread (%) 17 12.21 4.39 1.66 20.70
Bank assets/GDP 17 0.17 0.05 0.10 0.33
Bank concentration 17 0.51 0.19 0.39 0.95
Liquidity assets/deposit 17 0.25 0.07 0.11 0.36
Equity (N million) 17 434,396 752,941 5,450 2,788,537
Loans/liabilities 17 0.37 0.08 0.19 0.49
Real treasury bill rate (%) 17 -9.46 20.18 -60.34 11.20
Inflation (%) 17 23.34 21.16 5.38 72.84
Change in industrial production index 16 0.01 0.04 -0.06 0.07
Net interest margin 17 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.11
Panel data
(1992-2008)
Provision of bad debt/loans and advances 174 0.11 0.09 0.01 0.47
Dummy for new or merged bank 176 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00
Dummy for foreign-owned bank 176 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
(1993-2008)
Provision of bad debt/loans and advances 150 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.47
Dummy for new or merged bank 150 0.75 0.44 0.00 1.00
Equity/Lag of total assets 150 0.28 0.23 0.06 2.09
Dummy for foreign-owned bank 150 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00
Source: [Output gap] Author's calculation by HP-filter real GDP, IMF (2009) World Economic Outlook.; 
[Real interest rate] Author's calculation from lending rate and CPI inflation, IMF (2010) IFS;
[Inflation] Author's calculation; IMF (2010) IFS; 
[Private credit/GDP, Overhead cost/total asset, ROE, ROA, Interest spread, Bank assets/GDP,
Bank concentration, Net interest margin] Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009);
[Non-performing loan/total asset, Provision of bad debt/loans and advances, new or merged bank,
foreign-owned bank] CBN; [Liquidity assets/deposit, Equity, Loans/liability] Author's calculation,
CBN, Statistical Bulletin. Vol. 18 (Dec 2007) and Golden Jubilee Edition (Dec 2008).
[Real GDP per capita] IMF (2009) World Economic Outlook; [Real Treasury Bill rate,
industrial production index] IMF (2010) IFS36 
 
Table 6: Types of Banks and Bank Account Activity 
Status  Banked  Own business + Banked 
Ever used large bank  94.2  93.1 
Currently use large bank  96.3  95.7 
Use large bank as main bank  96.9  96.2 
Source: Author's calculation from EFinA (2008) 
Note:  "Banked" means that one has had any type of account at a bank. 
 
 
Table 7: Sources of Loans 
Source   Borrower 
Own business + 
Borrower 
Loan from large bank  8.4  6.0 
Loan from small bank  4.9  3.7 
Loan from other  86.8  90.3 
Source: Author's calculation from EFinA (2008) 
Note:  Loans from "other" include pool/savings, employer, family, and friends. 
 
Table 8: Financial Indicators, Community and Microfinance Banks 
Indicators  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Loans/Assets  34.8 33.4 31.7 29.9 30.3 34.8 
Capital/Assets 24.4 24.0 22.3 23.0 28.9 30.2 
Loans/Deposits  55.1 53.3 50.9 48.5 55.6 69.9 
Source: CBN Annual Report, 2003; CBN BSD, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008.
Note: Data between 2003-2005 are for community banks.  Data between 2006 and 2008 are 








Table 9: Bank Efficiency Estimation 




Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year >=2004 -6.100* -5.729* -6.980** -5.159 -6.523*
(3.342) (3.225) (3.177) (3.909) (3.914)
Overhead cost/total assets -273.235*** -268.070*** -284.957*** -270.452*** -285.726***
(88.680) (76.574) (69.467) (78.566) (71.941)
Bank assets/GDP -22.968 -15.324 -28.406 -19.462
(23.232) (19.820) (23.867) (21.532)
Bank concentration -26.619 -25.246
(18.843) (20.804)
Overhead cost/total assets -28.558 -19.662
 x Year >=2004 (29.596) (21.551)
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F 5.828 3.999 4.903 3.979 3.987
N 16 16 16 16 16
Source:  CBN, Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009).
Note: Results are reported for OLS models.  Data are for 1992 to 2008.
Newey-West robust standard errors for autocorrelation are in parentheses.
Interest spread, overhead cost/total assets, bank assets/GDP, and bank concentration are first-differenced.
Coefficients marked with an asterisk (***) are significant at the 1 percent level of significance; (**), 
at the 5 percent level; and (*), at the 10 percent level.38 
 
Table 10: Bank Efficiency Estimation 
Dependent variable: Interest spread (percentage points) 
   
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Year >=2004 -8.086** -8.594** -8.770** -7.879** -7.819** -8.290** -8.385** -7.498*
(3.406) (3.662) (3.604) (3.745) (3.778) (4.119) (4.096) (4.218)
Overhead cost/total assets -283.811*** -302.773*** -320.082*** -268.028** -282.775*** -301.656*** -320.213*** -265.844**
(87.277) (86.989) (85.901) (110.350) (92.193) (93.412) (92.335) (118.484)
Overhead cost/total assets -10.124 -11.699 -15.875 -14.066
 x Year >= 2004 (11.568) (14.775) (14.921) (12.502)
Liquid assets/deposits -25.166* -29.035 -31.574* -26.194* -26.305 -30.438 -33.718* -27.841
(14.972) (18.275) (17.560) (15.445) (16.948) (21.000) (20.348) (17.434)
Equity 0.000003 0.000003 0.000003 0.000001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Loans/liabilities -1.575 -0.498 5.589 -1.448 -0.416 5.919
(20.268) (20.030) (23.057) (21.755) (21.439) (24.695)




Log of industrial production index -18.344 -19.030
(22.527) (24.233)
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F 4.928 6.130 6.467 22.033 8.129 9.938 9.694 36.281
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Source: [Overhead cost/total assets, spread]  Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009);
[Liquidity assets/deposit, Equity, Loans/liabilities] Author's calculation, CBN, Statistical Bulletin (2007, 2008).
[Real Treasury bill rate, inflation, industrial production index] IMF (2010) IFS. 
Note: Results are reported for OLS models.
Newey-West robust standard errors for autocorrelation are in parentheses.
Interest spread, overhead cost/total assets, bank assets/GDP, and bank concentration are first-differenced.
Data are for 1992 to 2008.
Coefficients marked with an asterisk (***) are significant at the 1 percent level of significance; (**), 
at the 5 percent level; and (*), at the 10 percent level.39 
 
Table 11: Bank Efficiency Estimation 
Dependent variable: Net interest margin 
 
   
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year >=2004 -0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Overhead cost/total assets 1.080*** 1.071*** 1.091*** 1.088*** 1.080*** 1.095***
(0.227) (0.250) (0.247) (0.237) (0.265) (0.262)
Bank assets/GDP 0.038 0.029 0.057 0.048
(0.058) (0.055) (0.062) (0.059)
Bank concentration 0.031 0.025
(0.056) (0.059)
Overhead cost/total assets 0.066* 0.100** 0.091**
 x Year >=2004 (0.035) (0.045) (0.045)
Constant 0.041 0.004 0.006 0.020 0.000 0.002 0.013
(0.050) (0.047) (0.051) (0.069) (0.050) (0.053) (0.073)
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F 2.602 47.363 27.427 20.585 46.045 22.118 15.438
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Source:   CBN, Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009).
Note: Results are reported for OLS models.  Data are for 1992 to 2008.
Net interest margin, overhead cost/total assets, bank assets/GDP, and bank concentration are first-differenced.
Newey-West robust standard errors for autocorrelation are in parentheses.
Data are for 1992 to 2008.
Coefficients marked with an asterisk (***) are significant at the 1 percent level of significance; (**), 
at the 5 percent level; and (*), at the 10 percent level.40 
 
Table 12: Performance, Risk Management Estimation 





Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year >=2004 -0.185** -0.185** -0.019* -0.019* -0.001 0.006 -0.007
(0.072) (0.072) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Bank characteristics
New bank 0.182*** -0.014 0.184*** -0.018 -0.012 -0.010 -0.016
(0.031) (0.042) (0.033) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042)
Equity/lagged total assets 0.055* 0.055* 0.050 0.050 0.065** 0.067** 0.058**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Foreign ownership -0.257*** 0.040 0.022 -0.257*** -0.258***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027)
Financial structure
Bank assets/GDP -0.390*** -0.372*** -0.427***
(0.047) (0.046) (0.017)
Bank concentration -0.404*** -0.322** -0.159
(0.145) (0.156) (0.139)
Macroeconomic indicators
Growth rate, percent 0.001**
(0.001)
Inflation rate, percent -0.002***
(0.000)
Constant 0.116*** 0.312*** 0.131*** 0.034*** 0.258*** 0.483*** 0.483***
(0.035) (0.047) (0.032) (0.007) (0.055) (0.067) (0.066)
Bank dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes No No No No No
R
2 0.606 0.606 0.541 0.541 0.596 0.598 0.601
N 150 150 150 150 149 149 149
Source: [Provision of bad loans, loans and advances, equity, total assets] CBN; [Bank assets/GDP and Bank
concentration] Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009);
[Growth rate, inflation] Author's calculation, IMF (2010) IFS.
Note: Results are reported for pooled OLS models.
Robust Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parentheses.
Coefficients marked with an asterisk (***) are significant at the 1 percent level of significance; (**), 
at the 5 percent level; and (*), at the 10 percent level.